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Global Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
Abstract
The emergence of nuclear terrorism, a threat that President Obama called "the gravest
danger we face," has signaled a paradigm shift in international security. Since the collapse
of the Soviet Union, sensitive nuclear technologies and materials have become increasingly
available. Globalization and the inadequate enforcement of treaties and export controls
have allowed the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials. Today, international terrorist
organizations seek to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a means to influence
national policies around the world. AlQaida spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith declared that
in order to balance the injustices that have been inflicted on the Muslim population
worldwide, al-Qaida's new objective is "to kill 4 million Americans–2 million of them
children." As political scientist Graham Allison notes, this could be achieved with either
1,334 attacks similar in magnitude to those of 9/11, or one nuclear bomb.Building a nuclear
program is an arduous task that requires tacit knowledge, the recruitment of nuclear
scientists, engineers, and machinists, and the resources and time to obtain nuclear
materials and components. While it is unlikely that terrorist organizations have the
capacity to develop full-fledged programs in the near term, terrorist development and
acquisition of nuclear weapons remains a long-term threat that requires international
action.
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Global Risk of Nuclear Terrorism
By Emily Diez, Terrance Clark, and Caroline Zaw-Mon

Introduction
The emergence of nuclear terrorism, a threat that President Obama called
"the gravest danger we face," has signaled a paradigm shift in international security.1 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, sensitive nuclear
technologies and materials have become increasingly available. Globalization and the inadequate enforcement of treaties and export controls have
allowed the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials.2 Today, international terrorist organizations seek to employ weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) as a means to influence national policies around the world. AlQaida spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith declared that in order to balance
the injustices that have been inflicted on the Muslim population worldwide, al-Qaida's new objective is "to kill 4 million Americans–2 million of
them children."3 As political scientist Graham Allison notes, this could be
achieved with either 1,334 attacks similar in magnitude to those of 9/11,
or one nuclear bomb.4
Building a nuclear program is an arduous task that requires tacit knowledge, the recruitment of nuclear scientists, engineers, and machinists,
and the resources and time to obtain nuclear materials and components.5
While it is unlikely that terrorist organizations have the capacity to
develop full-fledged programs in the near term, terrorist development
and acquisition of nuclear weapons remains a long-term threat that
requires international action.6

State-Based Nuclear Programs: The Supply Chain
Unstable countries with successful or burgeoning nuclear weapons programs that support or refuse to control terrorism have engendered an
ominous security threat to the world community. Pakistan and North
Korea's refusal to participate in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) has not only disrupted regional security in East and Central Asia,
but has also contributed to second-tier proliferation, or the illicit nuclear
trade between developing nations with limited indigenous nuclear
resources and technologies.7 Nuclear proliferation experts believe that
second-tier networks are pervasive, interconnected, highly effective, and
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possibly linked to terrorist organizations.8 These networks have profited
from unsecured Russian stockpiles and contributed to the development of
illicit weapons programs in non-nuclear states.9
Ultimately, terrorist organizations lack the capacity to develop nuclear
arms independently and must seek assistance from states, private industries, and individuals. In order to minimize nuclear proliferation to terrorist groups, states should continue to strengthen export controls
worldwide, improve incentives for governments to enter into and fulfill
their obligations under the non-proliferation regime, and more carefully
monitor noncompliant states and individuals. This report considers the
roles that Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea play in nuclear proliferation
and identifies measures that should be taken to reduce the spread of
nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear terrorism.

Case Study: Russia
The collapse of a major nuclear state followed by instability and infighting
in the early 1990s resulted in a significant nuclear proliferation problem.
Russian leaders faced the challenge not only of securing nuclear material
but also of creating a new system of export controls in a newly minted
capitalist society. Although Russia has made significant strides in nuclear
non-proliferation with its heavy involvement in international agreements
and in establishing strong export controls, these measures have proven to
be inadequate.
At the end of the Cold War, Moscow controlled only eighty percent of its
strategic nuclear weaponry, with remaining materials and supplies
located in the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.10 Today, the Russian
Ministry of Defense maintains and consolidates these warheads located in
a small number of storage sites and facilities. Russia owns the world's
largest stockpile of weapons-usable fissile materials, including at least
950 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and approximately
145 tons of weapons-grade plutonium (plus or minus 30 percent).11 Of
this amount, Moscow has 350 tons of HEU and 55 tons loaded on nuclear
warheads.12 Although the government has decreased its number of
nuclear warheads since the mid-1980s, Russia's nuclear supply still
remains a major security problem.13
Moscow revised export legislation in 1999 and established the Export
Control Commission of the Russian Federation to coordinate export control lists for weapons materials and dual-use technologies. The Russian
Government recently enacted a number of controls aimed specifically at
20
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limiting nuclear proliferation. The passage of these measures demonstrates progress, but Russia continues to support missile programs and
civilian nuclear projects in high-risk nations for nuclear proliferation and
terrorist activities.14 Without effective nuclear material safeguards in the
Former Soviet Union (FSU), second-tier proliferation will increase.
Although Russia has a strong strategic interest in supporting nuclear nonproliferation, Moscow has not prioritized or provided sufficient resources
for effective export controls to stop the unauthorized export of nuclear
and sensitive dual-use technology and equipment. Not only does Russia
lack political will, but corruption and a scarcity of resources have also hindered non-proliferation efforts.15 Furthermore, as Russia has attempted
to expand its economy, the country has developed a business culture that
is averse to regulations, and firms have been slow to implement effective
compliance systems.16 Accountability and control are Russia's greatest
challenges, and safeguarding a large quantity of nuclear materials
remains a daunting task since Moscow lacks a comprehensive strategy for
accountability and security.

Case Study: Pakistan
As a nation racked with security problems, characterized by corruption
and instability, and firm in its defiance of the NPT, Pakistan is a particularly high-risk nation for nuclear proliferation. Pakistan is also a front line
for the War on Terror with a high prevalence of terrorist organizations
operating within its borders. Terrorism experts have long suspected that
individuals within the government and the military associate with alQaida. Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's 2004 confession of his involvement in black market nuclear trade unearthed serious
problems at high levels of government.
Pakistan is estimated to have 55–90 nuclear weapons and increasing
stockpiles of HEU and plutonium.17 Many of its nuclear weapons are
stored disassembled, which increases the risk of theft, smuggling, and
illegal export.18 Although Pakistan is not considered to be a major export
nation of WMD-related goods, the country's history of evading international non-proliferation agreements, lax nuclear export controls, and the
A.Q. Khan scandal demonstrate Islamabad's high risk.19 During the last
several decades of nuclear development, Pakistan acquired vital information and materials including uranium enrichment from Europe and missile technology and weapons blueprints from China.20 Those involved in
the nuclear program used front companies and intermediaries, falsified
documents, and purchased critical components for nuclear technolo21
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gies.21 These capabilities combined with weak export controls and other
vulnerabilities make Pakistan one of the most difficult cases for nuclear
proliferation. Pakistan is party to such international agreements as the
Nuclear Safety Convention and the Convention on Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material. Islamabad's export controls are decidedly weak despite
the nation's attempts to reorganize and restructure both its nuclear programs and export controls.22 Pakistan participates in other WMD conventions but continues to defy the international community by refusing to
participate in the NPT.23
Pakistan's proliferation history, nuclear capabilities and stockpiles,
inability to maintain control over its territory, and the prevalence of terrorist activity within its borders are causes for concern. The U.S. and the
international community should work closely with Pakistan to improve
security within Southeast Asia and pave the way to Islamabad's acceptance into the "nuclear club." This would increase regulations on Pakistani nuclear and dual-use materials, possibly decrease the availability of
sensitive material and technologies on the black market, and potentially
reduce illicit activities and terrorist access to nuclear weapons.

Case Study: North Korea
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, commonly known as
North Korea) remains one of the most challenging nuclear proliferations
cases. Although the United States and other developed countries have
banned trade with North Korea, Pyongyang continues to export missiles
and other potentially dangerous technologies. North Korea withdrew
from the NPT and is currently party to few (if any) international and
regional non-proliferation efforts.
Nuclear weapons experts believe that North Korea has developed one or
two nuclear weapons, and that Pyongyang has the capability to produce
6–8 more by reprocessing spent fuel stockpiles.24 Pyongyang claims to
have acquired significant plutonium stockpiles, but there is debate about
the amount and the potential threat posed by this supply.25 The DPRK
has also been a major exporter of ballistic missiles since the 1980s. The
regime has prioritized this program because it has brought considerable
revenue to the isolated country.26 There is great uncertainty surrounding
the North Korean nuclear program, but the instability of the nation and
Pyongyang's nuclear developments and missile tests are troubling.
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North Korea will likely continue to develop and produce ballistic missiles
with superior range and sophistication in order to maintain trade and
improve economic stability.27 The problem of spent fuel is also worrying
for the international community. Excess spent fuel could be sold on the
black market to second-tier countries or even directly to terrorist organizations.28 To date, there is no evidence that North Korea has sold or
transferred plutonium to other countries, but the possibility remains a
concern.29 Six Party Talks have failed to provide adequate assurance that
Pyongyang will not engage in such illicit activities.

Recommendations
To mitigate the nuclear proliferation risks posed by Russia, Pakistan, and
North Korea, the United States and other NPT nations should work to
tighten export controls, more effectively track Russian stockpiles, eliminate nuclear networks, and expand the non-proliferation regime.

Effective Export Controls
In 2003, following revelations that Libya would abandon its nuclear
weapons program, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials
discovered components for nuclear weapons worth hundreds of millions
of dollars including blueprints for a half-ton nuclear weapon in Libya.
While it is unlikely that a terrorist organization like al-Qaida will develop
weapons independently, small nuclear bombs could be smuggled or
purchased on the black market for the right price. It is imperative that
export controls be strengthened to limit the illegal proliferation of nuclear
materials.
Devising effective export controls that allow nuclear trade for peaceful
purposes without increasing the proliferation of nuclear arms is a challenge given the relative ease with which nuclear technologies could be
converted for use as weaponry. Although bilateral and multilateral
arrangements assist governments in developing and enforcing export
controls, it is ultimately the responsibility of an individual nation to limit
nuclear proliferation. States will not maintain effective export controls
without the political will, incentives, and the resources to enforce them.30
Governments must also balance export controls with international trade,
as strict regulations could also hinder trade relationships by making the
export process excessively onerous.
Political scientist Matthew Fuhrmann wrote in a 2007 World Affairs article, "To be truly effective, non-proliferation export controls must be
23
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implemented globally. Otherwise, a state wishing to acquire sensitive
dual-use technologies merely has to shop around to find a supplier with
weak or nonexistent controls."31 International agreements to curb the
illegal trade of nuclear materials such as the NPT, the Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
Goods and Technologies, and United Nations Resolution 1540, are only as
effective as the export controls of Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea, the
weakest links in the nuclear supply chain.
Policing non-compliant states remains a serious challenge. International
cooperation is just one component in developing a comprehensive nonproliferation export control system. Other important factors include
licensing, border and port security and enforcement, and collaboration
between national governments and private industry.32

Russian Stockpiles
Russian stockpiles are a major source in the nuclear supply chain, as terrorist organizations are able to acquire nuclear weapons and materials
through a network of providers in the FSU. The Wassenaar Arrangement
requires Moscow to be transparent in the transfer of conventional arms
and dual-use items and to use export controls as a counterterrorism tool.
However, Russia has failed to fulfill its obligations. Moscow has generally
prioritized domestic economic development over international security.
Encouraging Russia to be more proactive in its counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts continues to be a challenge.
Tracking Russian stockpiles more closely would enhance nonproliferation efforts worldwide. During the 2000 Clinton-Putin Summit,
the United States and Russia agreed to share real-time information on
missile launches and weapons-grade materials. To date, the plan has not
been implemented. Russia has made some progress in securing nuclear
materials by revising export legislation in 1999 and by establishing the
Export Control Commission of the Russian Federation to coordinate
export control lists for missiles and related dual-use technologies and
equipment. However, Moscow has failed to effectively regulate,
consolidate, and secure its nuclear materials.33
Nuclear material accounting is a fundamental measure needed to ensure
compliance with international agreements. More stringent safeguards
that include containment and surveillance are examples of ways to significantly diminish the threat posed by Russian stockpiles. Developing precision instruments for measuring sensitive materials and a more complex
24
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system to track their movements are other essential steps that can be
taken to mitigate this threat.

Illegal Nuclear Supply Networks
While it would be difficult to fully eliminate illegal nuclear supply networks, targeting key elements within the illicit trade would reduce terrorist access to nuclear materials and weapons. Nuclear forensics, cutting
supply, monitoring tacit knowledge holders, strengthening regulations,
and consolidating materials in Russia are methods that could be used to
diminish illegal nuclear supply networks.
Nuclear forensics is a relatively new science wherein analysts collect
debris from a bomb explosion or a sample of black market fissile material
and trace it to the source by identifying "nuclear fingerprints."34 While
this method has improved in sophistication and accuracy over the last
several years, there are limitations to its use as a deterrent. In order to be
effective, a deterring force must have commitment, credibility and military and/or law enforcement authority over national governments. The
current international non-proliferation regime's authority is limited by
the states that support it.
Acquiring tacit knowledge, or the expertise to develop nuclear weapons,
remains one of the greatest barriers that second-tier nations or non-state
actors face in building a successful nuclear program. In the short term,
these players lack the know-how to develop nuclear weapons.35 However,
this is changing. The consolidation, regulation, and security of materials,
as well as the restriction of tacit knowledge transfers, are vital to limiting
nuclear proliferation. It is imperative that illegal nuclear networks are
destroyed before they expand. International non-proliferation entities
attacking these networks must understand their unique structure, and
target the critical points within the structure, in order to effectively eliminate them. Nuclear supply networks are becoming increasingly dangerous
as they devise new ways to transmit knowledge and technology without
detection.
Ultimately, the most effective way to limit second-tier proliferation is to
strengthen regulations in Russia and consolidate materials. While nuclear
forensics has promise, it faces challenges of credibility, capability, and
commitment. Eliminating the supply to second-tier networks is a difficult
task, but it could delay nuclear proliferation to high-risk nations or nonstate actors. Efforts should be made to expand the nuclear supply regime
by offering high-risk nations greater incentives to denuclearize.
25
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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
International nuclear non-proliferation efforts are hindered by the refusal
of countries such as Pakistan and North Korea to participate in the international regime. These nations continue to produce, sell, and trade WMD
technologies without formal constraints, facilitating the emergence of second-tier proliferation networks.36 Diplomatic strategies have been
employed with little success, and economic sanctions have yielded mixed
results.37
Working harder to expand the "nuclear club" to include Pakistan could
motivate Islamabad to become a more responsible nuclear state. If Pakistan were to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the
international community could assist Islamabad in maintaining domestic
controls of nuclear and missile technology and more effectively regulate
the nation's nuclear trade.38 Reassessing the standards required for joining organizations like the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group would allow more nations to participate.39 The United States
should also consider establishing a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).
This agreement would require NPT nations to follow more specific arms
control measures.40
Understanding the diverse motivations that drive nuclear countries to
proliferate is key to limiting the spread of nuclear technologies and ultimately combating the threat of nuclear terrorism. Regional security concerns and economic constraints are frequently at the heart of nuclear
proliferation. Pakistan developed nuclear weapons to compete with India.
North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, abandoned it in 2003, and continues
to sell ballistic missiles today because the associated revenue stream is
integral to the country's economy.41 In this case, the Asian nation's economic interests have trumped international pressure.42 Islamabad and
Pyongyang have supported one another's nuclear endeavors by swapping
Pakistani weapons materials and technologies for North Korean missiles.
There is speculation that Pakistan will continue its weapons trade with
North Korea as Islamabad seeks missiles with greater accuracy, mobility,
and payload.43 It is important that the international community address
the regional nuclear imbalances of East and South Asia to decrease WMD
trade between these two nations.44 Limiting nuclear weapons material
production in Asia could help to mitigate the security concerns that drive
illegal nuclear production. North Korean economic interests should be at
the heart of the next round of Six Party Talks.
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The fight against nuclear proliferation is a challenge on all levels. While
supply side strategies directly address the problem of proliferation, a
renewed focus on the causes of demand for nuclear weapons would play a
critical role in combating future proliferation. A combination of supply
and demand side efforts would ideally influence the decision-making processes of current and prospective nuclear states and encourage adherence
to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.45

Conclusions
The War on Terror is the new Great Game where terrorist acquisition of
nuclear weapons is the ultimate threat, and our military installations,
places of work and homes are the new frontier. Nuclear non-proliferation
is a multifaceted problem that requires innovative solutions. To meet this
ominous new threat, the United States should lead the international community in strengthening export controls through improved cooperation,
expanding incentives to encourage nations to fulfill their obligations
under the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime, and policing those
states and individuals that fail to meet their obligations.
The United States should layer supply and demand side tactics in order to
counter the latest wave of proliferation. Continued support of export controls, agreements, and the establishment of new treaties are effective
methods to limit supply. The United States should also address demand
by encouraging high-risk nations to participate in the international
nuclear non-proliferation regime. These measures will likely improve the
security of sensitive nuclear technologies and reduce the risk of terrorist
acquisition of nuclear weapons.
According to former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, the likelihood of a single
nuclear bomb exploding in a single city is greater today than at the height
of the Cold War.46 From "mutually assured destruction" to modern-day
suicide terrorism, we have entered a new era in international security.
Nuclear terrorism poses a significant challenge to U.S.-led counterterrorism and counter-proliferation efforts. Only international cooperation and
proactive measures will effectively limit the dangers of this 21st century
threat.
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